The recent financial crisis has provoked major economic troubles. A key channel of transmission has been the contraction of credit supply by banks. This contraction was primarily caused by a reduction of transactions in the interbank markets and a clear reluctance on the part of banks to lend. The message to the broader global economy was unequivocal: banks were not just having a harder time lending, they were less willing to lend.
Credit supply by banks is of particular importance in emerging countries, where rudimentary financial markets place banks in a fundamental financing role. Foreign-owned banks and state-controlled banks typically hold significant market shares in these countries, so both groups are well poised to influence credit supply in times of crisis.
Our aim in this paper is to examine how bank ownership influences credit supply in troubled times. Our research is motivated by the fact that bank ownership can exert an impact on lending behavior in two ways.
Economic difficulties of the host country may cause foreign-owned banks to pull back on lending more than domestic banks. This is referred to in the literature as a "lack of loyalty" on the part of foreign banks (Weill, 2003) . Notably, the empirical literature comparing lending behavior of domestic and foreign banks in emerging markets in the 1990s does not support this hypothesis. In Latin America during the 1990s, for example, Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) find that domestic and foreign banks exhibited the same lending behavior during periods of crisis. Arena, Reinhart and Vazquez (2007) also study the impact of lending of foreign banks on the lending channel in emerging countries and find no significant differences in the impacts of foreign and domestic banks.
State-controlled banks, in contrast, may bolster their lending during a crisis to support the economy. Two arguments can explain this behavior following Sapienza (2004)"s terminology; the political view, and the social view. According to the political view, the principal of state-controlled banksthe governmentuses these institutions to pursue its interests, such as enhancing its chances of reelection or avoiding political unrest.
According to the social view, the government asks state-controlled banks to compensate for market failures such as externalities that can lead to the lack of financing for socially profitable projects. Both views lead to the fact that the objective function of state- Second, we employ an original approach to estimating credit supply from banklevel data that allows us to separate credit supply from credit demand without resorting to detailed data on borrowers and lenders. Unlike Khwaja and Mian (2008) , we do not need detailed data on all credit market participants to disentangle both sides of the credit market.
Our approach derives from the hypothesis formalized by Holmström and Tirole (1997) that credit supply is constrained by bank capital. If at least some banks are capital constrained, then credit supply can be estimated from the observed distribution of bank lending under relatively mild conditions. It is identified as the maximum of the bank lending distribution, and can be estimated in a parametric form using stochastic frontier analysis. To allow in-ference concerning the impact of bank type on credit supply, we allow credit supply to depend on bank type, bank capital, and idiosyncratic factors. 1 This method has been applied by Chen and Wang (2008) for Taiwan and Herrala (2009) for Finland to estimate credit supply from borrower data. Stochastic frontier analysis has also been widely applied in the banking literature to estimate bank efficiency (most notably, the 2010 study of Karas, Schoors and Weill on Russian banks).
Our results on the link between bank ownership and lending during recession have normative implications for banking policy in emerging markets. A finding in favor of a stronger reduction in lending for foreign banks in comparison to domestic banks supports restricting foreign bank entry. Conversely, an observation of a small reduction in lending for state-owned banks relative to privately owned banks supports the continued existence of state-owned banks.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the Russian banking industry during the recent financial crisis. Section 3 explicates our methodology and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our results, and section 6 summarizes with a couple of policy observations.
The Russian banking industry and the crisis
The development of Russia"s banking sector in the 2000s mirrored much of what transpired elsewhere in emerging markets. In addition to a rapid expansion of the banking sector (total assets grew on average a more than 35% a year), Russian banks began to provide a wide variety of services to corporate and household clients. The ratios of banking sector assets to GDP and credit to GDP more than doubled during the decade, with these ratios reaching 75% and 40%, respectively, by end-2010 (Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2011). Despite this significant increase in financial intermediation, however, both ratios were still lower than in most emerging markets.
Russian banks can be divided into three main groups in terms of ownership. The first group consists of the state-controlled banks that dominate the sector. Unlike the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, which used privatization to create banking sectors today dominated by large international players, Russia preserved the dominance of its state banks (resembling in some respects the current arrangement in China). Depending on the definition used, Russia has about 40 state-controlled banks that control slightly more than half of total banking sector assets. 2 Russia"s five largest banks are all state-controlled. As state banks, they face lower constraints in financing, hold an abundance of cheap household deposits, and enjoy ready access to refinancing from the All the other banks operating in Russia are domestic private banks. There are a lot of such banks, about 700 in total. Most are small, but they are in some cases important regional players. They account collectively for about 5% of total banking system assets.
Following a stretch of growth that included implementation of reforms and improvement in the legal environment, the Russian banking sector appeared in early 2008 to be in relatively good shape to withstand a crisis. Further, Russian banks were not directly exposed to the financial instruments that triggered the global turmoil. Yet the Russian banking sector, along with the rest of the economy, succumbed to the global financial crisis in mid-2008 with the dual shocks of a sudden lack of access to foreign financing and a significant drop in the price of oil.
As loan growth before the crisis exceeded growth of deposits, banks turned to external sources to finance the resulting gap. Russia has traditionally lacked long-term funding resources, so most funding came from abroad predominantly in the form of short-term borrowing. Banks were joined by Russian non-financial companies in turning to international markets to obtain financing. Thus, when the supply of foreign credit was cut, numerous banks and other companies found themselves in immediate difficulties. This situation was exacerbated by falling oil prices that led to a collapse in Russian share prices.
Margin calls were especially hard for those who had used shares as collateral in lending. 
Capital

Methodology
Our method of estimating credit supply is based on the model of Holmström and Tirole (1997) for capital-constrained lending. They argue that the loan supply of banks is constrained by bank capital. Accordingly, we assume a stochastic, log-linear loan supply constraint:
(1) In equation (1), i denotes bank, t time, L risk weighted assets, C capital, and v a stochastic disturbance. The parameter α is a "proportionality factor" of the loan supply constraint on capital, and β is the "scale effect" of bank size. If β=1, no scale economies are present in the loan supply constraint. If β>1, then larger banks can supply more loans than smaller banks relative to their capital. The credit supply constraint (1) can also be rationalized from the point of view of supervision that imposes capital requirements on bank lending. The
Basel II capital requirement is characterized as α=12.5; β=1; and v=0.
Our aim is to estimate the parameters of the credit supply constraint (1), and thereby gain insight about credit supply. To accomplish this, we consider two types of banks. The first is the case studied by Holmström and Tirole (1997) − a constrained bank for which credit demand exceeds the bank"s credit supply constraint. Here, the supply constraint (1) holds with equality and observed aggregate lending of the bank is accordingly supply-determined. The second is an unconstrained bank for which credit demand falls short of the credit supply constraint. In this case, observed bank lending is demanddetermined.
To account for both types of banks in the analysis, we denote by exp [-u it ] , the (inverse) distance of a bank from its loan supply constraint:
(2)
Since the loan supply constraint (the denominator) is an upper bound of L by (1) Equations (1) and (2) 
where l and c are respectively the logged values of risk-weighted assets and capital. Equation (3) is a stochastic frontier model. Standard estimation methods apply when v and u are independent random variables from specific distributions. We employ the standard assumptions in our estimations that v is normal and that u is either exponential or halfnormal. Our main estimation assumes an exponential distribution, as it provides a greater log-likelihood for the model. In estimations, we allow and confirm heteroscedasticity in both u and v. We estimate a pooled cross-section, rather than a panel, because it is important that all model parameters, including residual distributions, can change over time.
To investigate how the recent global financial crisis affected the loan supply of banks in Russia, equation (3) is estimated with Russian bank data that covers both the precrisis and the crisis period. The main interest is in changes in parameters α and β, which reveal changes in loan supply of banks relative to bank capital as the crisis progresses. It is important to note that these parameters capture all supply shocks that affect banks" loan supply relative to their capital. Such shocks include disturbances in the operation of the interbank market, systemic deposit runs, monetary policy, and regulation. The idiosyncratic residual v captures bank specific supply shocks, such as runs on individual banks.
We first look to see if bank ownership exerts an impact on credit supply during the financial crisis. To do so, we add dummy variables for government ownership and foreign ownership in the frontier model, i.e. these variables are always viewed relative to domestic private ownership. Further, we include interaction between ownership and time dummy variables for each quarter of the sample period. We add time dummies for all periods except the first one, so all other dummy variables must be interpreted as a comparison with the first quarter of 2007. This setup enables us to analyze the evolution of credit supply behavior for each category of banks by considering the evolution of the interaction variables between ownership and time dummy variables over the period.
The estimated equation takes the following form:
where s stands for state ownership dummy variable, f is a foreign ownership dummy variable, i is the index for banks, and t indicates the quarters 0 to 11 corresponding with the period 2007Q1-2009Q4. 
Data
Our analysis is based on the detailed bank level dataset of all Russian banks covering the period from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009. It contains quarterly balance sheet and income statement information provided by the financial information agency Interfax, which collects and organizes this data from the CBR. 3 The data are further cleaned by dropping observations that fulfill at least one of the following conditions: the ratio of average total loans to total assets is less than or equal to 5%, the sum of deposits is zero, or the capital-to-assets ratio is larger than 100% or less than 2%. 4 We only consider banks that participate in deposit insurance scheme (those outside the scheme are not allowed to collect household deposits). Our final sample consists of over 10,000 bank-quarter observations. For the all-important risk-weighted assets variable, we have available some 6,000
observations. Fortunately, this does not constitute a problem since the data on riskweighted assets are mostly missing for small banks that are not crucial to systemic stability of the banking sector. The descriptive statistics of capital adequacy ratio for all ownership subgroups are provided in Table 1 .
We distinguish between foreign-owned and domestic banks (which can be either state-controlled or privately held). State-controlled banks are defined as banks that are majority-owned by the government, the central bank, state-controlled companies or municipalities. To identify them, we use the classification of Vernikov (2009). Foreign-owned banks are those that have foreign ownership in excess of 50%, which is in line with how CBR defines a foreign bank. We use CBR data to identify foreign-owned banks.
Results
In this section, we first present results from our main model and then results using alternative specifications.
Main estimations
Our main model assumes an exponential distribution for the inefficiency term. The results are presented in Table 2 . Several striking results are immediately apparent.
First, given the level of capital credit supply falls with the arrival of the crisis.
Time dummy variables are all significant and negative from the fourth quarter of 2008, when the world crisis hit Russia, until the end of the sample period. Before that time, most are not significant, even if the ones for 07Q4 and 08Q2 were also significantly negative.
These results confirm the impact of the financial crisis with a significantly stronger influence starting in the fourth quarter of 2008.
Second, foreign banks overall reduce their credit supply more than domestic pri- after the collapse of Bear Stearns. We further find significant estimated coefficients of interaction variables for the last two quarters of 2009. Thus, even if the difference in behavior does not persist for all periods, these results support the view of a "lack of loyalty" on the part of foreign banks, i.e. foreign banks are less committed to assisting the domestic economy in troubled times. It is of interest to observe that the contraction of lending for foreign banks is not fully associated with the domestic economic situation in Russia. The fact that foreign banks react before the beginning of the crisis while other banks do not modify their lending behavior provides clear evidence of lack of loyalty. It means that foreign banks reduce their lending in a country even if it is not yet affected by the financial crisis, i.e. without reasons based on the negative macroeconomic situation. This shows a different lending behavior of foreign banks, which can be interpreted as the anticipation of the forthcoming negative economic evolution. It does not mean that only foreign banks predict the economic changes. However, domestic banks might consider the possible selffulfilling mechanism of their behavior as reduced lending might increase the chances of economic troubles and thus prefer to act differently. That is why the difference between foreign banks and domestic banks does not stem from different skills to anticipate the development in the economy but in a different sense of loyalty towards the domestic economy.
These results for foreign banks do not comport with other findings for emerging countries (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 2000) . The differences may result from the fact that the examined crisis was so extreme that it drove foreign banks to such behavior. In other words, foreign banks may not behave differently in credit supply in normal times or during Thus, our findings affirm the view that state-controlled banks have a different objective function than other banks: they support the economy in troubled times by limiting their reduction of credit supply. These results are in accordance with Micco and Panizza (2006) , who show that lending by state-owned banks is less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than private bank lending at the cross-country level. They are also loosely related to the finding of Jia (2009) on the lower prudence of state-owned banks in China. The estimations indicate a significant difference between the crisis reactions of state-controlled banks and private banks. Figure 1 shows that credit availability from statecontrolled banks was much higher relative to the private banks during the peak of the crisis (2008Q4-2009Q2). Starting from 2009Q3, the gap between private and state-controlled banks narrows as private banks expand credit supply. The gap between domestic and foreign banks is maintained as foreign banks keep their restrictive credit policies in place.
Alternative models
We now turn to the alternative models described in Table 3 . We start with a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our results to the distribution of the inefficiency term. Several possibilities for this distribution have been proposed and applied in the literature on stochastic frontier approach. 5 We consider a half-normal distribution rather than an exponential distribution for the inefficiency term in this robustness check as the half-normal distribution is commonly used in works applying stochastic frontier approach (e.g. Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010) . The log-likelihood is slightly lower with this distribution than with the exponential distribution, justifying our choice of the latter for our main model.
With few exceptions, this specification does not affect the results. We still observe the reduction of credit supply during the financial crisis with significantly negative time dummy variables for all quarters from the fourth quarter of 2008 until the fourth quarter of 2009, while no time dummy variables are significant before this time.
We show again that foreign banks have reduced their credit supply more than domestic private banks during the financial crisis. The results are similar for the interaction variables between foreign ownership and time dummy variables, which are significantly negative for the two first quarters of 2008 and the three last quarters of 2009. Finally, we still see the lower reduction of credit supply for state-controlled banks relative to domestic private banks. The interaction variables between state ownership and time dummy variables are all significant and positive for the fourth quarter of 2008 and three quarters of
2009.
Second, we test an alternative specification of our model in which we add interaction variables between capital and ownership dummy variables. This allows the sensitivity of the maximum risk-weighted assets-to-capital ratio to vary across bank ownership type.
It is important to test this since the scale effect of capital on credit supply constraints may vary significantly across types of banks.
Our main results remain unchanged even if we allow the scale effect of capital to vary across types of banks. The reduction of credit supply is again supported by the fact that time dummy variables are significantly negative for the fourth quarter of 2007 and all quarters from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009. We also observe a greater reduction of credit supply for foreign banks than for domestic private banks with significantly negative coefficients for the interaction variables between foreign ownership and time dummy variables for most quarters. Furthermore, we can still see that statecontrolled banks can be characterized by a lower decrease in credit supply during the financial crisis; the interaction terms between state ownership and time dummy variables are significantly positive for the last quarter of 2008 and the two first quarters of 2009. We conclude that even if the scale effect of capital appears to vary across the banking groups, our main findings are robust to such variation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how bank ownership influenced credit supply during the recent financial crisis in Russia. The Russian banking industry is of particular interest as it is characterized by a mix of foreign-owned banks, state-controlled domestic banks, and privately owned domestic banks. We apply an innovative methodology to analyze credit sup-ply using the stochastic frontier approach that allows assessment of bank credit supply in comparison to the level of capital − a key constraint for the bank.
The literature suggests that the behavior of banks during economic downturns may vary with bank ownership. Specifically, there is an expectation that foreign banks might reduce their lending more than other banks because of a potential "lack of loyalty" to actors in the domestic economy. State-owned banks, in contrast, might tend to keep lending as their objective function might include macroeconomic stabilization.
Our main conclusion is that bank ownership exerted an impact on credit supply during the recent financial crisis in Russia. Whereas credit supply overall diminished during the crisis, we observe that this reduction was greater for foreign banks and lower for state-controlled banks relative to domestic private banks.
Thus, we find support for the "lack of loyalty" hypothesis, whereby foreign banks are prone to a stronger reduction in lending than domestic banks in troubled times. We also provide evidence in favor of the view according to which the objective function of stateowned banks would lead them to support the economy during economic downturns.
The implications of our findings are that the privatization of state-owned banks and foreign bank entry may contribute to deterioration of the economic situation during an economic downturn. This does not mean that the policies to encourage entry of foreign banks should be abandoned; foreign banks generate many benefits such as efficiency gains in the sector (Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010) .
Looking ahead, our methodology for studying the bank credit channel holds considerable promise. Unlike the approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) Table 3 Estimation results for alternative specifications as robustness check
Estimations by maximum likelihood on a pooled cross section. All variables are in natural logarithms. Constant terms and time variable effects for capital are included but not reported. All models allow heteroscedasticity of the residuals in time. Residual parameters are not reported. Standard errors appear in parentheses next to estimated coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. All models converge normally. 
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